Yascha Mounk
The Good Fight
Camilla Cavendish on Why Falling Birth Rates Aren't a Feminist Success Story
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Camilla Cavendish on Why Falling Birth Rates Aren't a Feminist Success Story

Yascha Mounk and Camilla Cavendish discuss why fertility is falling everywhere—and what housing costs, dating apps, and intensive parenting have to do with it.

Camilla Cavendish is an award-winning journalist, broadcaster, and policy expert. She writes a weekly OpEd column for The Financial Times where she is a Contributing Editor. Camilla is the author of Generation Maybe: Why We’re Having Fewer Children and What It Means For Us All.

In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Camilla Cavendish discuss why plummeting fertility rates are more concerning than overpopulation; how dating apps, the “romance famine,” and the rise of intensive parenting are keeping people from having the children they want; and what governments and employers can do to close the “heartache gap.”

This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.


Yascha Mounk: I’m really excited to talk to you again and to talk to you about your new book. To take a step back, I am quite worried about the decline in fertility around the world. I think smart listeners of this podcast are starting to get and understand that this is an actual problem, but I’m struck by the extent to which the default assumption of a lot of people still is the opposite, which is that we have too many people in the world, humans are bad for the world, everybody’s going to starve, and we’re going to use too many resources.

Before we get into the really interesting things that you found about why there’s been a decline in fertility and so on, why should we worry about that? Why isn’t there something to celebrate? Why shouldn’t we be grateful that the world population is not exploding and so on and so forth?

Camilla Cavendish: Well, Yascha, this is exactly where I started because I also think we do have too many people in the world at the moment. I wrestled with that when I realised that this was the defining trend of our time. The answer is that we’re going to hit peak humans much sooner than the forecasters have expected. By 2060, possibly sooner, the human population on the planet is going to stabilize and then it’s going to start falling really quite fast. We see that already in Europe, we see it in most of the OECD, and it’s actually exponential. A little gentle downward trend is something we could argue the planet really needs, and climate change will be helped by that.

Imagine that in South Korea today, where the birth rate has just gone up very slightly from 0.7 to 0.8, for every 100 South Koreans today, they’re going to have around 12 grandchildren. That describes the magnitude of the effect. Even if you were to think it was a good thing, you have to consider the rapid transition and how we need to adapt to that.

Mounk: Obviously, in these industrial societies with very low fertility rates, of which there are more and more, it’s going to create huge problems. I guess the other point is that even worldwide, a lot of projections now show that the world population is about to peak in a number of decades and then will start to decline. When you look at some of the regions that still have a lot more fertility than others, where there is still rapid population growth, they’re actually declining in fertility faster than regions like Latin America did at a similar stage of economic development.

The other thing that I just find striking is that predictions of fertility have been overly generous all along. In each country, at every juncture, we thought there were going to end up being more people than there used to be, and then fertility fell faster than it did.

Cavendish: This is why it’s so fascinating. Demography is difficult because we are always looking backwards. You can only tell how many people are in any cohort once every woman in that cohort has reached around 45. Demographers are always looking in the rear-view mirror anyway, but as you said, they’ve got it significantly wrong. I think what has stunned people is the global extent of this.

Even parts of India, Tamil Nadu, for example, now have a lower birth rate than most of Europe. Even the richer parts of some of the poorest and biggest continents are in trouble. As we know, China’s working-age population peaked some time ago. It can’t make up those numbers through immigration, even if it wanted to, because it’s too big. Yes, it’s automating its way out of that, but it still doesn’t have much of a welfare state, and it’s going to have a rapidly aging population, which is going to create real problems for its economy and potentially its military prowess as well further down the line.

Mounk: You see that countries which a lot of people might think still have this rapid population growth are below replacement rate. That is true now, I believe, of Mexico; it’s true, I believe, of Thailand; it’s true of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Countries that historically you would associate with places where people, for either economic reasons or for religious reasons, have a lot of children are below the replacement rate.

Talk us a little bit through some of the main problems that this actually poses to societies. Presumably one obvious problem is pensions. There was a really fascinating poll in France recently where voters were asked how many working people they thought there were per pensioner in the country. On the center-right, which is the part of the spectrum that is most open to pension reform, they said it’s about four to one. On the far left, which is the part of the spectrum that is most opposed to pension reform, it was 17 to 1. The actual answer, I believe, is 1.7 or 1.8 to 1. Obviously there are things like the sustainability of a pension system, but is that just it? Is it just that we need kids so that they can pay for us when we’re old, or is it other things where we should be worrying?

Cavendish: There are several things here. Yes, all of our systems assume that we’re going to pay for the old through the taxes of the young. As you say, that model is running out of time. Our whole welfare system beyond pensions is based on that anyway.

I do think that some of the political problems we’re beginning to face, particularly in Europe, are actually the problems of the younger generation expecting that they’re going to be less well-off than their own parents. There’s a certain despair among some of the people I’ve interviewed in their 20s and 30s about their own prospects in this world. Part of that is that the older generations are actually hoarding more of the assets, if you like.

As you said with that poll, this has not been made clear. Politicians have been avoiding this subject for decades, and no one wants to level with older voters, who are growing in numbers. If we don’t do something fairly soon, the risk is that the grey vote will just dominate everything. Of course, France is a brilliant example of that, where Macron really, really struggled even to raise the pension age from 62. When Bismarck invented the pension, he set the level very carefully so that many people were going to die before they could even get a pension. If we don’t all work longer, we’re going to be in trouble anyway.

There’s another reason to worry about this exponential birthrate decline, and it’s actually what I call the “heartache gap.” What has become really clear from all the evidence I’ve looked at across every country where people have been surveyed is that millions of men and women are missing out on children they would like to have had.

We get that in different ways. Some of it’s asking 20-somethings about their ideals, which we can argue is a bit thin in terms of data, but we also get it from asking people in their 40s and 50s looking back. Over half of men and women in those surveys say, “I would have liked to have had a child,” or “I would have liked to have had another child.” Of course, the only child is now becoming the norm across Europe and a number of other countries, and a lot of people would have liked to have had more than one.


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There’s something going on here which is a really deeply profound human question. It’s not just about choice. If it was about people making free choices, I don’t think I would have written a book, because we can adapt. This is about the romance famine, the fact that straight men and women are really struggling to settle down, to meet somebody, to trust in somebody. Also, the wider context of housing costs, worries about the future, and so on all play into that.

The single biggest reason that women give in Europe when they’re asked, “Why didn’t you have a child?” is, “I just didn’t want one. I’m child-free and I’m happy about that.” That’s fine. The second biggest reason is, “I could not find a reliable partner to have a child with.” That’s incredible in a world where you would think that choice is ubiquitous. It’s easier than ever to meet someone online, but the reality of swiping and swiping again is that the business models of the dating apps do not want you to meet somebody for life, because then you’re not going to use them anymore.

There’s a growing distrust between straight men and women. There’s a huge politicization, particularly in the U.S. Democrat women aren’t going to even match to any man on Hinge who looks remotely Republican. When I’m at Harvard, where I’m a fellow, I’ve sat in rooms with my master’s students, highly eligible men and women who are literally sitting in a room with each other and saying, “We’d really like the government to provide spaces where we can meet people.” I’m thinking, what’s going on here? I did a seminar at Harvard Business School, and these people are the most eligible on the planet. They’ve got everything. The women said, “We do not put Harvard Business School on our Hinge profile. If we do, we don’t get any matches.” The men said, “We all put HBS on our profile because we’re the alphas.” This was so fascinating to me: we are still locked in a very old-fashioned status race. Straight men and women are looking for the things they’ve always looked for. Women are looking essentially to marry up, like they did in all those Jane Austen novels, but because women have outpaced men so comprehensively in higher education, they can’t all find a man who ticks the boxes that they have been led to believe they must tick. This is leading to a cascade of problems all the way down the social scale.

Mounk: It’s especially a problem given that in the United States, for example, fifty-eight percent of undergraduates at American universities are female. I imagine that there are somewhat similar figures for the UK. If it is a social expectation that women are going to marry up, and one of the great markers of class in our age is having gone to college, and there are only about two-thirds as many men who have gone to college as women, that immediately creates a gap in the market.

Cavendish: You’ve just expressed it brilliantly, Yascha. This is something that really surprised me. I had no idea how much we women have actually outpaced men. This is extraordinary. There are some great surveys I’ve got in the book from sub-Saharan Africa, where a lot of new universities are being created. Even in Uganda, again, women are outpacing men, but men are expected to pay for all the dates, they’re expected to pay the bride price, and this is leading to a huge renegotiation of the relationship. At the end of all of this struggle, it’s actually low-income men who are falling through the cracks of deindustrialization, and they are ending up alone, and they are ending up childless. Now, the people who are most likely to be involuntarily childless are low-income men, while certain women are going at it.

Mounk: That is quite different from what you’d expect. I think in this cultural conversation you’d expect it would be either these very educated career women or perhaps men who have pretty privileged lives, who are college-educated, who date around and then perhaps recognize it’s too late or something like that. You wouldn’t necessarily think of a twenty-seven-year-old construction worker who would love to have a stable relationship and perhaps to have children and who’s not able to find that partner.

This is really interesting. We’re starting to get into your explanation of a different kind of cause of this fallen fertility. To go back half a step, one thing I was struck by is that you say that you expected this to be, even if it has some adverse consequences, a feminist success story: that this is the empowerment of women, which has led many women to not feel that they have to have children.

I’m sure that thirty or forty years ago, a lot of women, perhaps most women, would have felt, if I don’t end up having children, then society is going to look at me as somehow faulty, somehow not a full woman, somehow not doing what my gender is destined to do, and therefore, even if I’m a little bit reluctant, if I’d rather be spending my time on earth in other ways, I guess I’d better have children. From that perspective, you might say, well, the fact that today there are many women who choose not to have children is an achievement. It is a way of having overcome these constraints.

You went into this research with some sympathy for that kind of story, some expectation that that was a big part of the picture, and you’ve concluded that in your view it really isn’t. Tell us about that piece.

Cavendish: Yes, children have become an option, not an obligation, and that’s a really good thing. In Southeast Asia, where we’ve got some of the lowest birth rates on the planet, the women I’ve interviewed are very much grabbing the opportunity. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea: these places urbanized very fast and became very economically powerful. Women moved forward and seized the chance to get on the ladder, but they remain quite traditional societies where women really are having to say it’s work or family.

One woman in Japan that I interviewed said, “Look, I wouldn’t mind a baby, but I couldn’t put up with a husband.” That’s a very common view over there. They’re liberated. Japan itself actually faces extinction because it’s not willing to import enough people, and they’re comfortable with that.

Mounk: By the way, one of my favorite anecdotes from reporting is from a good while ago now, when I was covering the Pegida protests in East Germany, which was the big anti-immigrant protest that started in East Germany, one of the first signs of a big wave that led to the rise of AfD and so on. I went to one of their Monday marches, which was meant to evoke the Monday marches in 1989 against the communist regime.

There were obviously a lot of German flags, some more historic German flags, and various things. One guy had a Japanese flag, and that seemed pretty out of place. I wondered why, so I walked up to him and said, “Excuse me, you seem to have a Japanese flag. Why?” I thought, is it about the Axis? What is bringing this far-right German guy to have a Japanese flag? He said, “Well, the Japanese have it right, because we have depopulation and they have depopulation, but we think we can solve it through immigration, whereas they’ve understood that that is the wrong solution and they don’t want to go for immigration.”

Cavendish: That’s so fascinating. Indeed, those are the conversations I’ve had with Japanese politicians in private. That’s their position. That’s hilarious, a brilliant story. Back to your original question.

There is a problem, I guess, that there’s something lacking from feminism, which is where you were going with this. I realize now, as an empowered graduate woman, I’ve managed to have three children, and I’ve managed to vaguely make it work. I clearly haven’t had it all, because when I give talks to younger women, they clearly look at me and think, my God, this generation is so haggard, this is not what we want. Nevertheless, there’s something that’s brilliant that’s happened to those of us in that graduate class: we’ve been able to forge ahead and do both.

A lot of the working mothers I’ve interviewed all around the world who call themselves feminists have been talking to me about their feeling that feminism has not valued motherhood enough. Actually, I think that’s a really interesting thought, and it’s always portrayed as very right-wing. This idea that we need to value parenthood is portrayed as right-wing, and I think particularly in the States it becomes especially polarizing, because the right-wing narrative in the States, the pro-natalist narrative, is very much that what they call “workism” has pushed everything else out. You get paid to send your kid into institutional childcare in a lot of countries in Europe, but nobody gets paid to stay home and look after their own kids.

In fact, one of the women who most influenced me is a wonderful woman in Sweden who had her third child and said to her husband, “We can’t cope, I’m giving up work.” He said, “No one in Sweden gives up work. This is ridiculous, don’t do that.” We all see Scandinavia as golden. We think they got it right. They had gender equality, they had childcare. The Scandinavian birth rate is going off the cliff at the moment. One of the things this woman, Madeleine, said to me was, “Look, I want to be able to stay home and I want that to be valued, and I want to stay home for a few years, and why should my taxes pay for other people to have their kids looked after by strangers and not me?”

There was a woman I interviewed in Scotland, and she said, “Look, I was worried I’d be judged for being a lesbian mother, but I’m not. I’m judged for being a stay-at-home mother.” These are successful working women. They’re not trad wives. There is a piece missing there.

The thing I’ve come to reflect on is, when we’re all going to live till 100 and we’re going to have to work till we’re 70, why do we push people ever upwards in their careers? Why do we essentially accelerate careers so that the early to mid thirties is the make-or-break time for both men and women? Why do we see a couple of years taken out to look after kids as dead time on the CV? That is so out of date, and yet it’s very, very difficult. This is all more difficult for men, who are really struggling. Good men who want to be good fathers are viewed as very weak and uncommitted if they even take paternity leave. Why can’t we change our view of the value of parenthood? It’s quite simple, and it doesn’t have to be political, I don’t think.

Mounk: I agree with this, but I have a follow-up question, which is to say that I find it very convincing in my social milieu of people who by and large have gone to good universities and have relatively ambitious careers, that this career crunch in your 30s and the fertility window coinciding is a huge problem. In academia it’s particularly extreme. You want to make tenure in the United States, you’re probably at some point in your 30s. It is a completely make-or-break moment. If you make tenure, then after that you have great job security and a pretty good life. If you don’t make tenure, then you either have to leave academia or adjunct for the rest of your life in many situations.

Cavendish: You and I know, because we exist in these universities, that all the professors seem to be in their 70s and 80s. They’re still working. Tenure takes you through another 50 years.

Mounk: Exactly, but the decision is made in your thirties. If you don’t work really hard in your thirties, you don’t get tenure. Then, once you get it, you could take five years off and do fuck all and nobody would know. There aren’t actually a lot of people who do that, but you could in principle take off five years and do virtually nothing and be fine. That’s after the time, especially for the women, when they can realistically have kids.

That’s not just academia. If you’re in a law firm, if you’re in management consulting, if you’re in i-banking, there are a lot of places where that is the moment that’s make-or-break. If you make the grade at that point, then you have a great career going forward. If you don’t, it’s going to be very hard to get back onto the same career trajectory. Clearly, one reason why we don’t change that is just that that’s much harder than having a little diversity seminar that talks about empowerment of minority groups and women or something like that. It’s a lot harder than even adding egg freezing to your fancy company health plan or giving a little bit more maternity leave or something like that. It requires actually rethinking the structure of these careers and therefore, to some extent, the structure of these institutions. I think we should, but it’s unsurprising that that’s a much harder thing to do.

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That explains my world. The other question I have for you is, to what extent does that explain the world of a factory worker or of somebody who works in fast food? There are a lot of people whose careers don’t have the same upper-middle-class arc, and it’s not obvious to me that they face the same kind of career crunch in their 30s.

Cavendish: You’re quite right. It’s very different. Again, the conversation here is often dominated by those greedy jobs and graduates. There’s very good research, actually, by Paula Shepherd at Oxford University. She’s properly interviewed graduates and non-graduates, and men and women within that, and that actually quite rarely happens. If you’re the fast food worker, you’re struggling with a different set of problems. Now, one of them is clearly income.

That relates to the intensification of parenting, which is this absurd expectation of parenting that you must be constantly shepherding your child from one activity to another and pushing them up the educational ladder. That applies to every social class. A lot of people who are non-graduates or working shift work will say they feel very judged. They feel very judged for not giving their children enough. In the old days, they would come home and they’d get their own tea. Now, you’re not allowed to leave a child alone for more than two minutes or you’re accused of neglect.

In South Korea, this has become extreme. The main reason for South Korea’s low birth rate is education fever. The government has had to step in and tell parents to let their children sleep at night because they’re being tutored till one o’clock in the morning. That’s also to do with this race: the premium on education, the nervousness about the future, the growing inequality. Blue-collar wages stagnated for a long period. The fast food worker is enduring that, but actually the main issues for men and women at that level are much more about “Can we live near our family, our own parents, and get their support?” That is an absolute make-or-break. That’s the biggest issue that you find, and that’s very much about housing.

It’s worse in big cities, where birth rates are low throughout the world. It’s particularly bad in England. It’s particularly bad in population-dense places. You see quite a lot of movement in the United States. You’ll see movement of families out from centers like New York into places where there’s cheaper housing. The critical thing is being near to that ecosystem of family. What we’ve lost is the village. David Brooks has written about this at the New York Times brilliantly. The nuclear family concept was a terrible mistake because it forced people into the notion that we have a totally atomized society: you’re on your own, you can’t have two parents, two kids in a car or whatever. It’s a very lonely concept.

What a lot of people in all social classes, but particularly the lower ones, lower-income people, are saying is, “Look, I need to be able to have some more support.” It’s not necessarily all institutional. It’s the grandparents, the relatives, the neighbors, that sense of the village. I think there’s something about our atomized, fragmented society that is undermining that.

The places I’ve found in the world where the birth rates are rising, the parts of the industrialized world which are bucking the trend, are all places where children are visible, offices have office crèches, and there is a network of support. They include Israel, but not exclusively Israel. There’s a village in Japan where they’re getting elderly people to volunteer at children’s centers. There are companies around the world which have a much, much higher internal birth rate than their national averages, and it all comes down to that fact that children are allowed to be seen and lots of other people will give you a helping hand.

Mounk: I’m trying to reconcile a few of the data points here. People do want more children than they end up having, and a good number of people end up regretting not having enough children. At the same time, they’re clearly not making the choice to have children, or at least not making the choice early enough. I wonder whether that is because there’s a latent demand for having children, but it obviously depends on the opportunity cost. If having children means that you can never get an hour’s sleep, most people are not going to choose to have children. I wonder whether the extent of your opportunity cost depends on whether you feel like you can still have a life.

What I’m struck by is that there are places where it feels to me like people can have a life with their children. They’re not necessarily the places that have the most children; some are places that have quite few children. I spend a lot of time in Italy, a low-fertility environment, so it’s clearly not the full explanation, but you can go to a restaurant with children. Unless you go to the fanciest restaurant in your town, everybody’s going to expect there to be some children around. People are happy to see children next to you. If you see a three-year-old having a tantrum, that just happens when there’s a three-year-old around, whereas there are other countries where you couldn’t take your three-year-old to many restaurants (there are a certain kind of family restaurants catering to that, but they’re mostly quite depressing) because you would feel judged. The waiters would look at you a little bit askew, and the people at the next table would make you feel like, why are you disturbing my precious dinner with your unruly child? Obviously it’s easier in countries in warmer climates, where you have a lot of outdoor dining, where children are running around outside of a restaurant and so on and so forth.

It seems to me like there’s this huge question of the visibility of children. Part of it is social contagion, and I understand that explanation, but part of it is just, well, there are so many children that you see because they’re integrated into the life of parents.

Cavendish: Sorry, there’s a bunch of questions in here. On the opportunity cost, obviously, the more interesting your life is, the more possibilities there are, the more stuff you’re seeing online, the more you think, what trade-off am I making? I found a wonderful woman who set up a full-time counselling service for couples in their 30s who cannot decide whether to have a child. These are people, “Generation Maybe,” who could have a child, but they wrestle with it. What she says is, “Okay, write down the pros of having a child, write down the cons of having a child.” The cons are really long, because the cons are opportunity cost: I could go on a long holiday, I can get some sleep. The pros are really abstract.

Part of this comes back to, I think, possibly the fact that those of us who are parents have always been very reluctant to talk about how wonderful and humanizing it is to have a child, because we don’t want to boast and we feel guilty and we know that not everybody has had the option. There are a lot of misery memoirs out there.

Mounk: Well, one specific piece of this that friends of mine have told me (I’m not going to name them for obvious reasons) was that they have a young child that sleeps wonderfully through the nights, and they feel like they can never say it. I don’t have children, so they can tell me, because good for you, I don’t care, but “we can never say this to anybody, because obviously the people who have children who don’t sleep great through the night are going to be so angry at us.” There’s a systematic skew in the perception.

Cavendish: Absolutely, there is. I also think it’s quite understandable. People who are happily child-free say to me, “Actually, all parents have to post-rationalize anyway. Once you’ve gone through the mirror, you’ve had the child, you have to say that they’re the best thing that ever happened to you, because otherwise what are you doing?” That is sort of true.

Just to come back to the social contagion point, because this is so important: when I was looking around the world, I thought, okay, as yet the explanations we’ve got on the table (housing costs, women’s empowerment) don’t fully explain why this phenomenon is now touching very, very different countries and cultures at different income levels all over the world. They don’t explain why Mexico has fallen below the US or why the UAE is lower than Germany. They don’t explain that. The piece that I think has been missing from the explanation so far is social contagion, and this is that sense of what is normal for other people. We are extraordinarily sensitive as human beings to the behaviours of those we regard as our peers.

There have been a lot of studies done in other fields. You know the famous Christakis-Fowler series on obesity, which showed that you would be much more likely to gain weight if one of your close friends gained weight. There are loads of things that we know about social norms and human behaviour, but this can also be applied to how many children we have. There are studies from Northern Europe showing that women working in offices are significantly more likely to get pregnant if one of their co-workers, who they regard as a peer, gets pregnant.

There are studies in Brazil: 40 years ago we had one of the most definitive natural experiments in the world, which was soap operas being beamed in by satellite to some regions of Brazil and not others. The soap operas were watched avidly every night by people in rural communities, and what they were seeing was empowered women in cities, mostly without children, where anyone with a large family was poor and looked down upon. The birth rates in those regions fell off a cliff because women were really strongly identifying with those people.

I think the iPhone, in that respect, has something to do with the acceleration of the birth rate fall in the last 20 years. I think it’s not because people are looking at screens so much they don’t have sex anymore, although that is clearly also happening to some extent. It’s much more because we’re all able to project and see a concept of what perfection is. Perfection does not tend to include being up all night, looking exhausted, and scraping up vomit. It just doesn’t. That’s got to be part of this explanation.

Mounk: I’m hesitating between two questions. I’m going to pose you both and let you sort it out. One is about the contagion part, and I’m not sure whether this is just a different way of putting contagion, or a different element of contagion, or whether that is an alternative explanation to contagion, but I think it is related. One way of putting it is, I’m going to look at my peers, I’m going to look at my friends, but my friends have kids. Perhaps I feel like nobody wants to hang out with me because they’re busy with their kids anyway, so I may as well have a kid.

The other part of it is, if there are lots of kids in your community, then there’s the infrastructure for kids. If there are lots of kids in your community, then it’s normal to go to a local restaurant with kids, because all of the potential patrons have kids. Obviously they’re kid-friendly, whereas if nobody in the community has kids and I still want to go out to the restaurant, then I’m the only one there with kids.

In the same way, obviously, it’s not just that if all my friends have kids, then I think, that seems cute, little Timmy’s cute, perhaps I should also have a child. It’s also that if I have a kid and all my friends have kids, I can drop my kids off with them for an afternoon, whereas if they’re single, then I probably can’t.

Let’s call both contagion. To what extent is the way in which childlessness is spreading about social emulation, and to what extent is it about the ways in which, when birth rates fall too much, it just becomes objectively harder to have kids?

Cavendish: Well, I don’t think most people think consciously through exactly that. Most people don’t think, gosh, okay, am I going to be able to get little Timmy looked after by a neighbor? It’s much more biological than that. It’s at an unconscious level, but you’re completely right. This is why the low fertility trap hypothesis, which Vegard Skirbekk and other economists came up with over 20 years ago now, suggested that this would become self-fulfilling for exactly the reasons you’ve pointed out: the restaurant becomes a bit hostile, you see fewer kids, and you may end up having just one kid.

There are two different public policy questions, I think. One is, how do you get people who want one child to feel confident enough to have one? The other one is, how do you get people who’ve already had one to feel confident having more? Governments which want to change this should probably distinguish between those two objectives.

Mounk: Just for background, because you talk about this in the book and I’ve seen this in other data as well, a lot of how we think about this is, do people have kids or do people not have kids? It’s enough for us to go from above-level fertility to well-below-level fertility for a lot of families that had two children to go down to having one child.

Cavendish: Yes, that’s what I mean. That’s the ultimate policy question, and actually governments have not been very good at that. Governments have failed across the board on this. They’re offering financial incentives to people, but if part of our new problem is that no one is coupling up because of the romance famine and no one can find a reliable partner, then there’s no point in offering a baby bonus, because that is certainly not going to get you over the line. Also, these problems are so deeply cultural, it’s very difficult for governments to address them.

A lot of my interviewees have talked about this: dogs are welcome in restaurants more than children. There are these endless stats about there being more pet strollers than baby strollers. In Japan, there are tourist maps you can now get which show you where to avoid if you don’t want noise. One of the categories is children who play with balls, so you can literally download a map that will keep you away from that. That is just a perfectly normal human process.

The levels of childlessness we have in England now are very similar to what we had at the end of the First World War. About one in five women will never have a kid. That’s very similar to what happened at the end of the First World War, but the birth rate overall did not decline, because all the other women had bigger families. The issue now is, as you say, rising childlessness but also shrinking families.

The other ultimate thing that happens is what the Chinese call the “4-2-1 problem.” In China, of course, most people are still only children. Women have absolutely refused to go back up the curve. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party is using, I’m very worried, horribly similar language and mechanisms to try and get women to have more children now as it did to try and stop them. The 4-2-1 problem is where you have one child essentially looking after two parents and four grandparents. That is a massive burden, not just financially, but emotionally. I say that as an only child myself. I’m the only child of an only child, and I had three children, perhaps because I didn’t want them to end up in the situation I was in. I think that takes us towards a much lonelier world as well.

Mounk: The other thing that people talk about in this context in China is the “little emperor problem,” which I find slightly sexist because it’s only said about the men, and I think it’s probably just as true about the women. On the one hand, you have the expectation that you help care for two parents and four grandparents. On the other hand, of course, you grew up as the focus of attention of four grandparents and two parents, and so you come in with a set of expectations about how your potential partner treats you and centers you. I’m saying this also as somebody who grew up as an only child, but for a half-brother: somebody who didn’t have to share, who didn’t have to acquire all of those social skills. That is all the more extreme if you’re really the only descendant of these three generations. That’s one of the reasons why people in China are having trouble coupling up.

You’ve hinted at this a few times in a few different ways, but we haven’t quite gone in depth on it yet. Why is it so hard for people to couple up? Human beings have managed to couple up for literally, I’m not going to say millennia, but it’s more like millions of years. There are obviously all kinds of societies where there are all kinds of taboos about seeking a mate in various ways, and also mechanisms that would then do that for you. Now, there’s very little of that. You can go on an app.

It’s funny, by the way: I remember the times when some friends would first mention that they might go on a dating app or something like that, and it felt a little bit weird. I thought, I wonder whether the social stigma is ever going to go away. Interestingly, I think there’s no social stigma at all about being on a dating app, but there is still some social stigma about looking for friends online. There are some attempts to do that. I think Bumble at some point had a version of Bumble that was for finding friends, but that actually has retained its social stigma. There’s no social stigma about being on dating apps, and they present you with dozens of options all of the time.

You’re talking about this environment at Harvard where very eligible people who want partnership are sitting in a room together and it doesn’t occur to them that the other people in the room might be options. What’s going on here, in your mind?

Cavendish: It’s worse than just the dating. It’s actually the whole of the relationship escalator that you and I understand has broken down. It used to be that you’d meet someone, you’d see them, then you’d start dating exclusively, then you would move in together, then you might get married or make a more formal partnership, and then you’d have a child. That whole process has broken down. In Finland, couples who move in together under 35 are now more likely to split up again than they are to have a child. This whole old-fashioned process has broken down. At every stage of the process, there is doubt and there is questioning about what else might be possible, and there is irritation.

Part of this is completely natural, which is that women are much more likely to have a career. Dual-income households are pretty much essential now, and women are more likely to want to actually work. The split of household chores, the most banal thing in the world: one of the best studies is by Matthias Doepke at LSE. He’s basically plotted the correlation between countries where men don’t take out the bins and countries where women say no to the second child. It’s a straight-line correlation, basically. There’s that whole negotiation going on about how we actually live together.

Before that, there is this sense of filtering people out online. Obviously, dating apps allow you to set filters for all sorts of things. Women are setting their height filters at six feet, thereby excluding a large proportion of the male race. Many, many men and women don’t get any matches. This is the other thing we have to remember. The male incel narrative is that 20% of men get 80% of all the matches. That’s not actually quite true. Lyman Stone in Canada has actually done the maths on that. It’s literally impossible that they could do that, but quite a lot of people who are not regarded as eligible in some way are not getting anywhere online. They’re being pushed out again to the frontier.

It does enable people to be very, very picky about what they think they want. You have to put filters on, otherwise you’re just swamped in a morass. Several young men have said to me it’s much easier to date online. There’s much less risk. If you get a match, you know that somebody is up for it. You don’t feel such pressure on making the first move in an environment where people do feel on the back foot. They also say you just feel less committed, because if you meet someone who’s a friend of a friend or a cousin of a cousin, there’s some kind of link there. Somebody will ask.

Mounk: Some shared social network, which raises the costs if that person says, this person was being an asshole to me, or whatever.

Cavendish: It raises the cost. I think that’s it. Now you get far more ghosting, you get the situationship. The situationship is this thing where you’re basically dating.

Mounk: The situationship is different, though, because with a situationship two people have found each other, but they can’t commit.

Cavendish: Yes, exactly. I think this is men getting away with it. My view is, in that sense, not a lot has changed.

Mounk: There’s one theory here that I see online, and I have no idea. I think it’s incel-adjacent, but it has some kind of logic to it, so I’d be interested to hear what you think about it. It sounds a little bit similar to what you’re saying, but not exactly.

That theory is that women do obviously get a lot more matches on these dating apps than men, and that this encourages two sets of behaviors. Among the men that are particularly attractive, it gives them a lot of options. They never commit, because they can have lots of easy casual sex and it’s easy to get distracted by that. For the women, it creates a slightly different effect, which is that they keep going on dates with those men that seem promising, but they perhaps get their hopes up. They end up having sex with them, and then the men end up not being very interested in them.

In a way, that creates three sets of unhealthy attitudes. The men who get a lot of matches just think, these women are replaceable, and I can keep doing this forever and just having fun and treating them quite badly because I can get away with it. The men who get very few matches get frustrated, and they’re the ones who then claim these women all have impossible standards and so on, which is, I think, untrue, but it has a kernel of truth.

A lot of women feel, these men are terrible because they’re all treating me badly, because in a way they can go out for a date with somebody who, to put it very brutally, might be out of their league, and they can go on a few dates with them and they can sleep with them, but they might not be able to then keep the interest. Each group ends up getting hurt in different ways. Is there something to that, or do you think that’s too simplistic?

Cavendish: There’s quite a lot to that. A lot of women I’ve interviewed would talk about Peter Pans. It’s the Peter Pans or the alpha men you’re talking about, and it was ever thus. Those men don’t need to be tied down, and they have a biological clock, but it’s 10 years later. That is certainly true, and it’s always been true. I suppose you could argue that we just have fewer guidelines and fewer stigmas now about doing that.

There’s also the narrative about the girl boss. There’s a lot of narrative online about men being trash and girls being the boss. I know there’s an incel-adjacent narrative around this; I also think it is genuinely quite undermining. A lot of the language about men is also making it very, very difficult for men to know how to play any of this.

Ultimately, all of this is also partly because we have pushed everything later. We grow up much later. The average age of leaving home in many countries, from Australia to America to Europe, is 25. Some men in Italy are still in their childhood bedroom at 35. That is partly a product of the economy, and it’s partly a product of this race for education, this race for a university degree, which then incurs debt and which then may not actually lead to a great job.

If you leave everything much later, it does take longer to settle down. A lot of the data is showing women saying, “I really wanted to start a family earlier, but I couldn’t find anybody.” As you said earlier, that just bumps us up against the biological clock. That leads us to the other point, which is that modern men and women are so well informed except about the biological clock.

Men in particular actually have no idea that sperm counts are falling and that they are just as likely to be infertile as women. I have a great interview in the book with a man in Australia who’s really, really open about how he got each of his three children. It’s miraculous. One was born to a surrogate, but he’s the only man I could find who was willing to speak about his own infertility. He says none of his friends will talk about it. All we see is the Robert De Niros, the third-time-around dads, proudly pushing strollers at 70. There is something very hidden here. There’s a very hidden taboo about infertility and miscarriage, which is driving a lot of the heartache gap in the first place.

Mounk: You said something earlier about the iPhone and social media and perfection, the search for perfection. I think in that context, what you’re mostly talking about is that you want a perfect life where you’re making duck face in front of a yacht in a bikini or something. I wonder whether there’s a different kind of striving for perfection, which is the perfection of parenting, where people have this very strong sense that you can’t possibly have two children if each child doesn’t have their own room, because you would somehow be imposing something unacceptable on the child. You can’t possibly have two children if you can’t send them to, at the very least, a lot of fancy after-school activities, or perhaps, in certain kinds of social milieus, to the right private school or whatever.

More broadly, there’s the rise in intense parenting, which I just find striking observing it, where there’s a sense that when you’re spending time with your child, the child needs to be the center of attention, which then makes the time you spend with your child incredibly exhausting and fuels the need to be away from your child and to have more childcare and to perhaps not have a second child. Is that social contagion of parenting norms that are unhealthy? The opportunity cost is higher in part because what is expected of a parent has gone up so much.

One statistic I’ve seen in the United States is that women spend more time doing childcare today than men do. That was true 30 years ago as well, but men actually do more childcare now than women did 30 years ago. We’ve both leveled up.

Cavendish: Yes, that’s exactly right. This is true in almost every country, except France, fascinatingly. In France, men and women have not increased the hours, and France actually still has a pretty strong birth rate, so there may be a clue there. I do think, if you go to dinner with a French family, the children come along, but they’re seen and not heard. It’s a very old-fashioned kind of proposition.

This is so right. Donald Winnicott famously said we just need to be a good enough parent. I think in the 60s that was very much the mantra: be a good enough parent, be around. Now it is the “never enough” parent. The interviews I’ve done on this have staggered me. The studies have staggered me. My youngest child is 17, but I feel incredibly lucky that I’m not younger, because the expectations are impossible, and the expectations are coming from schools themselves. They’re coming from other parents, they’re coming from social media, and the truth is, helicopter parenting does not actually benefit the child.

I think one of the messages that we need to get out there is that actually baby Mozart in the womb and driving your child to softball every Thursday night is not necessarily best for them, for their psychology, or indeed for getting them into an Ivy League college.

When you said you were an only child earlier, I was thinking, you and I both, maybe we are the spoiled, selfish stereotype. I don’t know. I’ve been obsessed with reading all the research on only children because of the fact that I have always been bearing that label myself. Look, it’s not definitive, but I think what the Chinese one-child experiment really showed is that having one child and then helicoptering around them does not necessarily help them become a team player. The studies that were done in China show those people tend to be more risk-averse, and funnily enough, Chinese employers don’t even necessarily want to employ them.

I think we’re doing parents an enormous disservice if we suggest that somehow they’re boosting their child’s chances by cosseting them and spending every hour teaching them to play music.

In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Camilla discuss possible policy solutions, how fatherhood has changed, and why egg-freezing isn’t the answer to the challenge of the biological clock. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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